No, not in the case of Sandra Flora Sneed Larsen v. Pamela Larsen Stack, et al., Record No: 190832 (2020) where the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court’s decision that the will did not create a life estate, but did give the surviving spouse the right to reside in the house and access the entire property until she was no longer able to do so.
In Larsen, the two surviving children of the decedent filed a case for declaratory relief against the surviving spouse, their stepmother. The decedent’s will gave the farm and house to his children, subject to his wife’s “right to reside in [the] home . . . for so long as she is physically and mentally able to do so.” In addition, the surviving spouse was to receive rental income from a cell phone tower on the property. In the next section of the will, the testator gave a life estate in other real estate to his surviving spouse with a remainder interest to his children.
The circuit court judge held that the language of the will regarding the farm was ambiguous, and therefore allowed parol evidence – testimony from the attorney who drafted the will. The attorney testified that it was the testator’s intent to allow his wife to live on the property until her condition deteriorated to the point that she would go into a nursing home, and that he did not provide for any greater property rights in order to maintain her eligibility for Medicaid (which will pay for unskilled care and nursing home costs while Medicare will not.) The judge held that the will did not create a life estate, but did give the surviving spouse something less – the right to reside on the property and access to all the property for so long as she was physically and mentally able to do so.
The surviving spouse appealed the adverse declaratory judgment to the Supreme Court of Virginia with three assignments of error: 1. The circuit court judge erred in deciding the will did not create a life estate; 2. The circuit court judge erred in deciding the will gave the decendent’s children access to the property while she was alive; and 3. The circuit court judge erred in allowing parol evidence of the testator’s intent.
The Supreme Court of Virginia first recognized that the intent of the testator controlled the interpretation of the will, that it was the ““polar star” to guide and direct the interpretation of the will,” citing Feeney v. Feeney, 295 Va. 312, 318 (2018) quoting Roller v. Shaver, 178 Va. 467, 472 (1941). Next the Court recognized that the trial court must review the whole will and apply the plain meaning rule in determining the testator’s intent. The Court then noted that extrinsic or parol evidence could properly be allowed if the language of the will is ambiguous, capable of more than one interpretation, citing Gaymon v. Gaymon, 258 Va. 225, 230 (1990).
In this case, the Court upheld the trial court’s decision that a life estate had not been created because (1) the drafting attorney testified that that was not the testator’s intent; (2) the testator had expressly given a life estate in another parcel of property in the following section, demonstrating that this grant must be something different; and (3) the grant of rents from the cell phone tower only for as long as the surviving spouse resided in the house contradicted the granting of a life estate in the farm property. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial court’s decision that the surviving spouse’s right to possession was not exclusive, but rather concurrent with the rights of access by the surviving children, as exclusive possession was not expressed. The Court recognized that the only limitation on the surviving children’s rights to access was that the widow’s right required that she be free from molestation and interference by them, citing its prior decision in White v. White, 183 Va. 239 (1944).
Finally, the Court noted that parol evidence was properly allowed by the trial court judge in Larsen, as it was necessary to determine the scope of the surviving spouse’s rights. In a will case, a court may allow parol evidence to determine the “quantum of interest which is to pass by will”, Parsons v. Fitchett, 148 Va. 322, 329 (1927). In particular, this will did not clearly indicate whether the surviving spouse’s interest was limited to the dwelling unit or if she had the right to use the entire property. The drafting attorney’s testimony was necessary to resolve the ambiguities in the will.
The Larsen case illustrates the importance of being very specific in the provisions of a will with respect to the scope or quantum of rights granted if the bequests or devices are not absolute or unconditional.